State of Utah v. Milo Simons : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
State of Utah v. Milo Simons : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Gray; Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey R
Buhman; Counsel for Appellee.
Douglas J. Thompson; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Simons, No. 20080109 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/713
Case No. 20080109-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, 
Utah County, the Honorable James R. Taylor presiding 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 DOUGLAS J. THOMPSON 
Utah County Public Defender Ass'n 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Counsel for Appellant 
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Requested 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 212011 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CaseNo.20080109-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, 
Utah County, the Honorable James R. Taylor presiding 
JEFFREY S. GRAY (5852) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 DOUGLAS J. THOMPSON 
Utah County Public Defender Ass'n 
P.O. Box 1058 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Counsel for Appellant 
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Requested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l A b L t i i * 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF i u. ^ I - L . . . . " ...' 1 
CONS'7"TTi"' \ "\ x ; ROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES : 
STATEMFX i (>F \ HL C \SE. 2 
- \ i " \ : . " : r : ' • . • " " - . . j 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMLX t * 
. >.L-_M:'A ../ 
THE OFFICER'S BRIEF INQUIRY OF THE PA^SFXGLR-
DEFENDANT AFTER DISCOVERING DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
IX THE DRIVER'S DOOR WAS REASONABLE .. 
1
 'X-". "S j.6 
ADDENDU M: Minute Entry re: Motion to Suppress 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009) 6,13,14,16 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)... 7,15 
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).. 9 
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) 14,15 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) 12 
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) 9 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) 8 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) 8 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) ....6, 9,10 
STATE CASES 
State v. Baker, 2010 UT18,229 P.3d 650 ..............8,16 
State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000) 13 
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,103 P.3d 699 .2 
State v. Golotia, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003) 13 
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,100 P.3d 1222............. ..................2 
State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004) .......12 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES * 
U.S. Const, amend IV '.: 2 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (West Supp. 2006) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009) 1 
-ii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20080109 
IN THE ' 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 




Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West Supp. 
2006). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
After discovering chewed on baggies of methamphetamine in the driver's 
door, Deputy Luke turned his attention to Defendant—a front seat passenger. 
He informed Defendant of the paraphernalia and asked if he had anything on 
his person [the deputy] needed to know about. Defendant replied that he had a 
pipe in his underwear. 
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Issue. Did the deputy exceed the scope of a lawful detention by briefly 
turning his attention away from the driver and asking Defendant whether he 
had anything the deputy should know about? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppresses a mixed question of law and fact. The court's factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11,100 P.3d 1222. The 
court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, 
including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 
95,111,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. 
R.6-5. Following a preliminary hearing, he was bound over to district court to 
stand trial. R.18,92. He thereafter moved to suppress evidence seized during 
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the traffic stop of a car in which he was a passenger, arguing that a question 
posed to him by a sheriffs deputy was beyond the permissible scope of the stop. 
R.35-24. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion in a signed 
minute entry. R.49-46. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and the remaining 
charge was dismissed. R.72-71,69-58. In so pleading, he reserved the right to 
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. R.61. Defendant was sentenced to a 
suspended prison term of up to five years and placed on supervised probation 
for 36 months. R.90-88. Defendant timely appealed.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On the evening of October 21,2006, Deputy John Luke was working near 
Springville, Utah with Dan Thomas, a deputy trainee. R.92:5,10 (R.49). While 
patrolling SR-77, the deputies observed a vehicle traveling 60 miles per hour 
(mph) in a 50 mph zone. R.92:4,17-1S (R.49). After a computer check revealed 
that the vehicle was also uninsured, Deputy Luke made a traffic stop. R.92:5,17-
19 (R.49). The deputy trainee made initial contact with the driver and identified 
him as Kevin Sorenson. R.92:5 (R.48). Deputy Luke approached the passenger 
1
 The record does not include the notice of appeal, but the docketing 
statement includes a copy of the notice, date-stamped February 1, 2008. 
2
 Citations to the trial court's findings appear in parentheses. 
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side of the vehicle to observe the exchange. R.92:5,19-20,27-28 (R.49-48). 
Defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat, but Deputy Luke did not 
speak with him at that time. R.92:5,20,27-28. 
After the deputy trainee identified the driver, he met with Deputy Luke at 
the front of their patrol vehicle to discuss the stop. R.92:21,28 (R.48). Deputy 
Luke then approached the driver to issue a citation. R.92:21-22,28 (R.48). He 
explained to the driver the reason for the stop and requested his driver's license, 
registration, and proof of insurance. R.92:5,22. The driver explained that the 
vehicle was not his and that he could not produce proof of insurance. R.92:5,22 
(R.48). As he spoke with the driver, Deputy Luke did not smell the odor of 
alcohol, but"observed [other] signs of possible impairment," including watery, 
bloodshot eyes and 'Very rapid speech and movement." R.92:6,20,22-23 (R.48). 
Deputy Luke returned to his patrol car to conduct a records check. R.92:6 
(R.48). While awaiting the results, he observed that the driver was "very, very 
fidgety," his movements were "very agitated" —"[h]e moved constantly[,] 
touching his mirror several times, moving his head several times." R.92:6,23. It 
was "[ujnusual behavior," and based on his experience, Deputy Luke believed it 
was "a possible sign of impairment." R.92:6,23 (R.48). After completing the 
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records check, Deputy Luke reapproached the driver, who then "blurted" out, 
"I'm not drunk, I haven't been drinking, look at my eyes." R.92:22-23,6 (R.48). 
Deputy Luke asked the driver to step out of his car for the purpose of 
conducting field sobriety tests. R.92:6,23 (R.48). But when the car door opened, 
Deputy Luke saw, in plain view, "baggies which had been used, chewed," in the 
side compartment of the door. R.92: 23-25,7-8,28 (R.48). Based on his 
experience, Deputy Luke believed that the baggies were consistent with the 
storage and use of drugs —it's "the only use [he had] ever seen" them for. 
R.92:8,25 (R.48). After retrieving the baggies, Deputy Luke verified that they 
contained "a white powder of a small crystal residue," which he recognized as 
methamphetamine. R.92:8,24-25,27. He then asked the deputy trainee to stay 
with the driver while he spoke with Defendant. R.92: 8,25 (R.48-47). 
Deputy Luke explained to Defendant that he "had found paraphernalia in 
the car and asked him if he had anything on his person [he] need[ed] to know 
about." R.92:9,25 (R.47). Defendant immediately responded that he had a pipe 
in his underwear. R.92:9 (R.47). Defendant then exited the vehicle at Deputy 
Luke's direction, shook his pants leg, and a glass methamphetamine pipe "fell 
out onto the ground." R.92:9 (R.47). Deputy Luke then directed Defendant to 
the front of the patrol car. R.92:9-10. 
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In a subsequent search of the driver's person, the deputies found on the 
driver a small satchel containing methamphetamine and $561 in cash. R.92:10-
11,26 (R.47). After the driver was placed under arrest, Deputy Luke 
reapproached Defendant and commented that he was "being very cooperative." 
R.92:12. Defendant then volunteered that he had some in his pocket and 
surrendered a baggie of methamphetamine. R.92:12 (R.47). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After discovering drug paraphernalia in the driver's door, Deputy Luke 
turned his attention to Defendant, a front seat passenger, informed him of the 
paraphernalia, and asked if he had anything on his person the deputy needed to 
know about. The deputy's question to Defendant was justified because it is 
reasonable to believe that driver and passenger are engaged in a common 
enterprise. Where a search of any of Defendant's belongings in the car would 
have been justified, see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), certainly the 
brief inquiry of Defendant was justified. Even assuming, arguendo, that Deputy 
Luke's question was unrelated to the purpose of the stop, the inquiry did not 
render the detention unlawful, because it did "not measurably extend the 
duration of the stop," Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (2009). 
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ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICER'S INQUIRY OF THE PASSENGER-DEFENDANT 
AFTER DISCOVERING DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN THE 
DRIVER'S DOOR WAS REASONABLE 
The trial court ruled that the chewed baggies of methamphetamine 
observed in plain view "were not only strongly likely to be paraphernalia," but 
their "used condition implied use of the drugs they might have contained." 
R.47, Continuing, the court ruled that" [t]hat suspicion coupled with the signs 
of possible impairment [by the driver] lead to a reasonable suspicion and 
concern about both occupants of the car." R.47. The court thus ruled that 
"questioning [Defendant] about drug possession or use . . . [was] reasonably 
suggested by his concerns." R.47-46. The court then concluded that "[o]nce it 
was confirmed that [Defendant] was [also] in possession of drug paraphernalia, 
arrest and a further, concurrent search of his person was justified." R.46. This 
Court should affirm. 
* * * 
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must be (1) "lawful at its 
inception," and (2) "executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 408 (2005). Defendant does not challenge the initial detention, 
conceding that it was justified based on evidence that the driver was speeding 
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and the car was uninsured. See Aplt. Brf. at 11. The only question on appeal, 
therefore, is whether the stop was executed in a reasonable manner. 
To satisfy this latter requirement, "the detention 'must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop/ " State v. 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, f 17,229 P.3d 650 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983) (plurality opinion)). In other words, officers must act "diligently" and 
may not "unnecessarily prolong [the] detention." United States v. Slwiye, 470 U.S. 
675,685 (1985). Officers are, of course, "allowed.. . to graduate their responses 
to the demands of [the] situation." Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696,709 n.10 (1983)). Thus, "[i]f, during the scope of [a lawful] traffic stop, 
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010 
UT 18, f 13,229 P.3d 650. Otherwise, "the officer must allow the seized person 
to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded." Id. 
Defendant concedes that discovery of the drug paraphernalia in the 
driver's door created new "reasonable suspicion . . . as to [the driver] (or even 
probable cause)," supporting further "detention and investigation." Aplt. Brf. at 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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9.3 Defendant argues, however, that Deputy Luke impermissibly " delay[ed] 
concluding the lawful purpose" of the detention when he "stopped dealing with 
[the driver]" and asked Defendant whether he had "'anything on his person 
[Luke] need[ed] to know about/ " Aplt. Brf. at 13. He asserts that this 
"deviation changed [his] detention from one based on evidence and justified by 
reasonable suspicion to an illegal seizure" because, he claims, there was no 
individualized suspicion as to him. Aplt. Brf. at 7,13. His claim fails. 
The answer to the question presented here lies in the United States 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence respecting automobile searches, to wit, the 
Court's decisions in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), and Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
In Di Re, the Supreme Court addressed whether a search conducted 
pursuant to the automobile exception includes the "search [of] any occupant of 
such car when the contraband sought is of a character that might be concealed 
on the person." Id. at 584. In that case, police officers stopped a car based on an 
informant's tip that the driver was selling counterfeit gasoline ration coupons at 
the identified location. Id. at 583. Both the driver and his front seat passenger, 
3
 See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (noting that it was 
uncontested that officer's recovery of five baggies containing suspected cocaine 
established probable cause). 
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Di Re, were taken into custody and searched. Id. The search of Di Re uncovered 
two counterfeit coupons. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that vehicle 
occupants "could be used to conceal [such] contraband on [their] person/' but 
declined to extend the automobile exception to the "search of guests in a car." 
M. at 587. ,»* ; 
More than 50 years later, the Supreme Court in Houghton addressed a 
similar issue—whether the automobile exception embraces the "search [of] a 
passenger's personal belongings inside an automobile." 526 U.S. at 297. After 
making a traffic stop, the officer in Houghton observed a syringe in the front 
pocket of the driver, who then admitted using it to take drugs. Id. at 298. 
Officers ordered the driver and his two female passengers — one of whom was 
Houghton—out of the car. Id. Even though the only evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing was found on the male driver's person, officers searched 
Houghton's purse in the backseat and found a syringe containing 
methamphetamine. Id. Relying on Di Re, the Wyoming Supreme Court held 
that the automobile exception did not extend to the passenger's belongings. Id. 
at 299,303. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 299-307. 
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In reversing, the Supreme Court observed that "a car passenger . . . will 
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same 
interest in concealing the fruits of the evidence of their wrongdoing/' Id. at 304-
05. It also recognized that a driver "might be able to hide contraband in a 
passenger's belongings." Id. at 305. The Court thus held that" '[i]f probable 
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of 
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search' 
" —"without a showing of individualized probable cause for each [container]." 
Id. at 301-02 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied in Houghton). 
Although contraband may be concealed on a passenger's person—the 
situation in Di Re — as readily as among a passenger's belongings, Houghton did 
not overrule Di Re. The Court noted that Di Re "turned on the unique, 
significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one's person." 
Id. at 303. The Court reasoned that the search of a passenger's person is not 
justified absent individualized suspicion, because "the degree of intrusiveness 
upon personal privacy and indeed even personal dignity. . . differ substantially 
from [a] package search." Id. at 303. On the other hand, the Court concluded 
that the search of a passenger's belongings is justified because the "traumatic 
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i 
consequences [of a body search] are not to be expected when the police examine 
an item of personal property found in a car/' Id: 
* * * • • • ' : ' " • • ' > . { 
The issue in this case, of course, involves the brief questioning of a 
passenger (Defendant), rather than a search of the passenger's belongings or 
•A 
person. But Houghton is instructive. As noted, Houghton recognizes that it is 
reasonable to believe that passengers may be engaged in a common enterprise 
with the driver. Houghton thus held that while this fact alone does not justify a 
search of a passenger's person—owing to the high "degree of intrusiveness" 
involved —it does justify a search of the passenger's belongings, where the • < 
degree of intrusiveness is far less. Id. at 303. Under Houghton, Deputy Luke 
would have been justified in searching any belongings that Defendant may have 
had in the car. And under Houghton's rationale, he was likewise justified in 
merely asking Defendant whether he had anything he needed to know about — a 
measure that was much less intrusive than a search of belongings. See United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-80 (1975) (recognizing that intrusion 
occasioned "when an officer stops an automobile and questions its occupants 
. . . is modest"); see also See State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 722-23 (Haw. 2004) 
(recognizing that "an investigative stop is less intrusive than a search of the 
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vehicle's contents or an arrest of the driver"); accord State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 
359, 366 (N.J. 2003) (same); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000) 
(recognizing that "the level of intrusiveness occasioned by a detention" for 
questioning does not rise to the level of a search for weapons). This Court 
should thus affirm the trial court's ruling. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Deputy Luke's question to Defendant was 
unmoored from the legitimate, though evolving, purpose of the stop, under 
Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009), it did not render his detention unlawful. 
In Johnson, gang task force officers stopped the driver of a vehicle for a 
registration violation. Id. at 784. While one officer spoke with the driver, 
another officer spoke with Johnson—a backseat passenger. Id. at 784-85. 
Johnson was wearing clothing consistent with gang membership and had a 
scanner in his pocket, but officers "had no reason to suspect anyone in the 
vehicle of criminal activity." Id. The officer questioned Johnson in an attempt to 
gain information about his possible gang affiliation. Id. Johnson said he did not 
have any identification/volunteered that he was from a town the officer knew 
was home to a Crips gang, and revealed that he had been in prison for burglary. 
Id. at 785. Based on these answers, Johnson's clothing, and his possession of the 
scanner, the officer suspected that he may be armed and frisked him. Id. 
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i 
The Supreme Court addressed two questions: (1) whether a frisk for 
weapons requires, as a prerequisite, reasonable suspicion that the suspect is 
involved in criminal activity, Id. at 786-87; and (2) whether questioning 
unrelated to the legitimate purpose of a stop renders the detention unlawful, id. 
at 787-88. The Court's answer to the second question is relevant here.4 
The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that the officer's authority to 
detain Johnson, and thus her authority to frisk him, ceased once she "undertook 
to question Johnson on a matter unrelated to the traffic stop, i.e., Johnson's gang 
affiliation." Id. at 787. The Supreme Court flatly rejected that conclusion. It 
held that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the 
traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful 
seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the 
stop." Id. at 788 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93,100-01 (2005)) (emphases 
added). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Deputy Luke's question to 
4
 In answering the first question, the Court held that assuming there is 
reasonable suspicion the passenger is armed and dangerous, an officer may frisk 
the passenger for weapons so long as "it is lawful for police to detain an 
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation." 
Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 784. It held that "[t]he police need not have, in addition, 
cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity." Id. 
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Defendant was unrelated to the legitimate purpose of the stop, that fact did "not 
convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure/' Id. 
The State acknowledges that Deputy Luke walked a few feet away from 
the driver and asked Defendant whether he had anything the deputy needed to 
know about. But that action could only have extended the stop by mere 
seconds. Johnson held that unrelated questioning is permissible "so long as [it] 
do[es] not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. (emphasis added). In 
other words, unrelated questioning that only extends a stop incrementally, such 
as occurred here, will not render it unlawful. The question is not whether the 
officer's actions extended the stop by a few seconds or minutes, but whether it 
prolonged the stop "beyond the time reasonably required to complete" its 
purpose. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,407 (2005). It cannot be said on these 
facts that the question posed to Defendant prolonged the stop beyond the time 
reasonably required to investigate the driver's impairment or possession of 
paraphernalia. 
Defendant argues that under Baker, any extension of time during a stop, 
no matter how slight, renders it unlawful. See Aple. Brf. at 10-13,15. But the 
Utah Supreme Court in Baker did not purport to overrule Johnson, which deals 
with officer conduct during a lawful detention. Instead, Baker addressed the 
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propriety of extending a detention after the purpose of the stop is concluded. See 
Baker, 2010 UT 18, ^  31 (holding that "any detention of an individual after the 
purpose of the initial detention has concluded violates the Fourth Amendment") ( 
(emphasis added). ; 
As conceded by Defendant, his continued detention was justified while 
Deputy Luke "continued to investigate [the driver's] sobriety/7 as well as the 
contraband possession, and thereafter "effectuated his arrest, or issued a 
citation." Aple. Brf. at 13. The allegedly unrelated question posed to Defendant 
during that time did not "measurably extend the duration of the stop," Johnson, 
129 S.Ct. at 788, or otherwise prolong it "beyond the time reasonably required 
[for Deputy Luke] to complete" his lawful investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted January 21, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY S. GRAY sy 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Uiab Countv.,8tate of Utah 
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' ^f'ft^f .Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
StateofUtah : 
Plaintiff ; Minute Entry 
vs. : • Date: 
Kevin Sorensen, :. Case Number: 061404282 
Milo B.Simons 0614042835 
Defendants ; Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of each of the Defendants to 
suppress evidence seized at the time of their arrest. For the reasons explained below the motions 
are denied. 
The State and both Defendants indicated to the Court that they wished to submit the 
motions upon the facts as elicited during the preliminary hearing. This Court conducted the 
hearing and has a transcript of the testimony. 
On October 21st, 2006 at an undetermined time of day Deputy Sheriff John Rockwell 
Luke was patrolling on SR 77 in Utah County with trainee officer Dan Thomas. They observed a 
vehicle traveling at a steady 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. The license plate 
was reported to dispatch who informed the deputies that records available to them indicated the 
vehicle to be uninsured. The officers made a traffic stop. Deputy Luke first went to the 
passenger side of the vehicle where he observed Defendant Simons in the front passenger seat. 
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The trainee deputy went to the driver's door. After a brief exchange the deputies met behind the 
vehicle and then Deputy Luke approached the driver, Defendant Sorensen. The reason for this 
procedure was that the trainee, Deputy Thomas, was being given experience in the stop and 
approach but it was determined that if a citation were to be given Deputy Luke would be the 
citing officer. Deputy Luke confirmed that Mr. Sorensen could not provide proof of insurance 
for the vehicle. 
During this exchange Deputy Luke observed what he considered to be signs of 
impairment. These signs included watery, bloodshot eyes; rapid speech and movement and 
agitated, rapid body movement. The deputy felt that the unusual body language indicated 
possible intoxication or impairment. He stepped back to check records on the suspects and then 
re-approached the driver's side of the car. Mr. Sorensen, not in response to any question or 
comment, blurted out that he was not drunlc and, forcing his face toward the window, asked the 
officer to look in his eyes. 
From these observations the deputy concluded that he had a suspicion Mr. Sorensen wras 
driving while impaired. In order to continue investigation of that suspicion he directed Mr. 
Sorensen to get out of the vehicle. When the door was opened he observed in plain view in the 
door compartment two used corners or fragments of baggies which were consistent with the 
storage and use of controlled substances. In an effort to investigate a suspicion that the 
occupants of the car may have recently used drugs the training deputy was directed to stay with 
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Mr. Sorensen while Deputy Luke questioned Mr. Simons, who was still in the vehicle. He told 
Mr. Simons he had found paraphernalia in the car and asked if he had anything on his person that 
he needed to know about. Mr. Simons immediately told him that he had a pipe in his underwear. 
Mr. Simons then stepped out of the vehicle at the deputy's direction. A pipe fell to the ground 
out of his right pant leg. Both Defendants were then searched and methamphetamine was located 
a small sack or satchel in Mr. Sorensen's,left coat pocket and, also, in a small pants pocket of 
Mr. Simons. 
It is well established in Utah that an officer may stop a vehicle for an offense committed 
in his presence. Indeed, in this case neither defendant challenges the propriety of the initial 
traffic stop. A traffic stop is a level two encounter, which may be based upon reasonable 
suspicion. Officers may conduct a reasonable investigation suggested by such a suspicion. 
In this case Deputy Luke's initial suspicion of driving while impaired was quickly 
supplemented by his observation of drug paraphernalia in plain sight when the car door was 
properly opened to remove Mr. Sorensen to investigate the possible DUI charge. The baggies 
were not only strongly likely to be paraphernalia, the used condition implied use of the drugs 
they might have contained. That suspicion coupled with the signs of possible impairment lead to 
a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car. The tactics including 
a quick search of Mr. Sorensen's person and questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or 
use, followed by a search of his person (perhaps a bit of an overstatement since the search 
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consisted of having him step and literally shake a leg so the paraphernalia slipped down his pant 
leg to be recovered by the officer) were reasonably suggested by his concerns. Once it was 
confirmed that Mr. Simons was in possession of drug paraphernalia, arrest and a further, 
concurrent search of his person was justified. Consent of either Defendant to the search was 
irrelevant and this Court makes no finding on that point 
Dated this 27th 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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